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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FE/P - Mr. Connors

FROM : CA - Mr. Perkins

DATE: September 26, 1951 MR.

SUBJECT: Possible Questioning of Ambassador Jessup Regarding Formosa

REVIEWED BY *P. A. [illegible]* DATE *10/1/51*

RDS [] or XDS [] EXT. DATE

TS AUTH.

REASON(S)

EXISTING MARKINGS

REASON(S) FOR EXEMPTION

With reference to Ambassador Jessup's memorandum to you of September 25 calling attention to certain questions respecting Formosa which he may be called upon to answer, CA presents the following information and comments which may be helpful to Ambassador Jessup.

There are attached hereto two draft position papers dealing with the United States attitude respecting the question of Formosa under the conditions respectively, that an armistice is concluded in Korea, and that an armistice is not concluded in Korea. These draft position papers which are being prepared for use during the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly have been tentatively cleared in FE and UNA. As you are aware, position papers of this nature also require further clearance including the Department of Defense. While the draft position papers attached have been submitted at a working level to the Department of Defense for comment, they have not been cleared by that Department nor do we yet have its comments.

In general, our present view is that we should avoid, if possible, discussion of Formosa in any of its several aspects in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Our present view, accordingly, is that the present agenda item, Question of Formosa, should be permitted to expire with the expiration of the Fifth Session and should not be carried over to the Sixth Session. We believe that if no armistice or cease-fire agreement is reached in Korea the probability is good that we would be able to successfully oppose consideration of any aspect of the Formosa problem in the General Assembly. On the other hand, if a cease-fire is reached there might well be substantially greater pressure for consideration of Formosa in one way or another. We would consider discussion of the Formosa question within the context of a proposed Korean settlement or consideration of the mission of the Seventh Fleet much more objectionable than consideration of the broad question of Formosa as proposed in the draft resolution of last year. If we were unable to block entirely consideration of Formosa in one of these more objectionable forms, we might find it desirable to press for consideration of the question along the lines of last year's resolution. One of the principal advantages which we see in consideration along the lines of last year's resolution lies in the fact that the process which we envisage would probably consume a great deal of time. We would not expect the Commission established to look into the entire question to report its findings during the present session. We see no reason why Ambassador Jessup should not say, if

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questioned regarding our reasons for preferring this way of handling the matter, that owing to the complexity of the subject and the fact that many members of the United Nations are not thoroughly familiar with it, we believe that the type of consideration provided for in the draft resolution of last year would require a long period of study and investigation and that the resulting delay in UN consideration of the question would be highly advantageous to us.

We believe that Ambassador Jessup on all important points can refer to the testimony of the Secretary as still being the position of the United States. There have been some minor changes, notably in the instance cited by Ambassador Jessup regarding the total number of cases in which the question of Chinese representation has been considered by the UN and related international organs. We understand that UNP is preparing an up-to-date summary of this record.

While we believe that the United Nations would probably provide the best forum for the discussion of the political future of Formosa, if and when the time comes for such discussion, we would be reluctant to assume a hard and fast position on this question until forced to do so.

Insofar as we are aware, the President's press statement of August 31, 1950 was not brought up in the MacArthur hearings. It is perhaps worth noting that this statement was made prior to the massive intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea. In any case it was made abundantly clear during the hearings that basic United States policy is to prevent the seizure of Formosa by forces inimical to the United States.

It is no longer accurate to say that the Security Council is dealing with Chinese Communist aggression since the agenda item, Complaint of Aggression Against the Republic of Korea, was removed from the agenda of the Security Council on January 31, 1951.

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Position Paper
Sixth Regular Session
General Assembly

SECRET
September 25, 1951

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FORMOSA

PROBLEM:

To determine the United States position on Formosa in the Sixth General Assembly assuming an armistice is concluded in Korea.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE:

The policy of the United States is to deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the U.S.S.R. and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. In the light of this policy, as appears below, no acceptable disposition of Formosa appears possible at this time. Our immediate objective therefore is to postpone the issue, and work as far as possible toward the development of an acceptable solution, keeping in mind the importance of maintaining the maximum possible support of other nations, particularly among the Asians.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The United States should oppose:
 - a. Any General Assembly move to link the Formosa question to the settlement of the Korean problem.
 - b. Any move to call a conference on Far Eastern problems (including Formosa), prior to a political settlement of the Korean problem.
2. It is in the interest of the United States to avoid discussion of the question of Formosa at the Sixth Session. No solution acceptable to the United States is feasible in present circumstances. At the same time public discussion in present circumstances could only expose and underline the differences between us and our allies. We should inform other delegations, if questioned regarding our views, that while the armistice

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armistice ended hostilities, peace and security were not yet fully restored; in the circumstances it does not appear that a satisfactory permanent solution could be achieved at this time. The question could be re-examined when there is a political settlement in Korea or when the armistice had been in effect sufficient time to establish Chinese Communist good faith and intentions.

3. If it appears that despite our efforts to discourage the consideration of the Formosa question, the question will be taken up, the United States should endeavor to steer the consideration toward a proposal that the Assembly establish a special commission to gather facts, hear interested parties including the Formosans, explore all possible solutions, and report to the General Assembly when done.

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September 25, 1951

COMMENT:

BACKGROUND:

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In his statement of June 27, 1950, the President announced:

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

"Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

On August 31, the President said that it would not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits if the Korean matter was settled. These statements were made prior to the large scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

The U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists charged in the Security Council and in the General Assembly that the United States had committed aggression against China by its action with respect to Formosa. Both United Nations organs decisively rejected these charges.

In September, 1950, the United States submitted for inclusion on the agenda of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly "The Question of Formosa" as an important and urgent matter. In his speech in the Assembly, Secretary Acheson affirmed that our action to neutralize Formosa was taken without prejudice to the future political status of Formosa and that the United States had no territorial ambitions and sought no special position with respect to Formosa. He explained that the problem of Formosa and its eight million inhabitants should not be settled by force or by unilateral action and stressed the legitimate interest of the international community in having this matter settled by peaceful

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by peaceful means. He requested that the Assembly give attention to the solution of the problem under circumstances in which "all concerned and interested parties shall have a full opportunity to express their views and under which all concerned parties will agree to refrain from the use of force while a peaceful and equitable solution is sought."

The inclusion of the Formosa question in the Assembly's agenda was approved by 42 votes in favor, 7 against with 8 abstentions. The Chinese Government did not favor the inclusion; the Chinese Communists and the Soviet bloc were opposed to the consideration of this question by the Assembly.

Private discussions in New York on the subject of a possible solution of the Formosa question disclosed no consensus of views.

The United Kingdom delegation suggested to us a draft resolution which as amended was tentatively approved by the Department of State. This draft resolution, which received the general concurrence of other Commonwealth Delegations, provided for the appointment by the Assembly of a commission which, "bearing in mind China's claim, taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa, and giving consideration to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, should study the problem and submit a report to the Assembly containing recommendations for the future of Formosa". The resolution further recommended that pending the study, there should be no attempt to seek a solution of the status of Formosa by force, and that Formosa should not be considered as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland.

Opposition developed within the United States Delegation, particularly to the reference to the Cairo Declaration in the preamble of the draft resolution; fear was expressed that such reference would be interpreted in the United States as opening the way to giving Formosa to Communist China. Certain objections were also raised to the draft resolution by the Department of Defense. Accordingly, when the item

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came up in the Political Committee on November 15, 1950, we proposed its postponement, emphasizing that the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea had created a new situation and that since the Security Council was then actively dealing with the Chinese aggression we feared that Assembly consideration would prove prejudicial to the efforts of the Council. A substantial majority supported our proposal for postponement, and discussion in the Assembly was deferred indefinitely.

When the question was reached again on the Assembly agenda on February 7, 1951, the United Kingdom proposed a further postponement because, "in view of the unsettled nature of the situation in the Far East, any decision taken might give rise to misunderstanding at a later date." The United States supported this proposal, which was approved by 38 votes in favor to 5 against with 5 abstentions.

Under its present instructions the United States Mission to the United Nations is to support or propose again an indefinite postponement of the question of Formosa when it is reached on the agenda.

Thus far, the Formosa problem does not appear on the provisional agenda for the Sixth Assembly.

Before the Joint Senate Committee meeting in June, 1951, Secretary Acheson reaffirmed the United States policy of neutralizing Formosa. (p. 1729). Affirming that the United States will not allow Formosa to be taken by force (p. 1755), he said: "If, as and when the war in Korea is stopped, and the defiance of the United Nations is stopped, then those two questions, the Formosa question and the question of Chinese representation can be discussed in United Nations channels. We will continue to take our point of view and put it forward as persuasively and strongly as we can. Others can take other points of view, but it is a matter which can be discussed. It can't be discussed as long as you fight." (p. 1784).

DISCUSSION.

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DISCUSSION:

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A. Possibilities of a Settlement Consistent with United States Policy Objectives.

1. Formosa as part of "China".

Ethnic and historical factors support the proposition that Formosa should be part of China. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated their intention in the Cairo Declaration that Formosa should be restored to the Republic of China. Division in the world community regarding the government which properly represents China complicates the implementation of this Declaration. In these circumstances the above solution would not adequately protect the United States security interests which require that Formosa be denied to a regime aligned with or dominated by the U.S.S.R.

2. Trusteeship or other forms of United Nations administration or supervision.

The trusteeship system was intended to apply to people not yet capable of self-government. The Formosans themselves may possibly favor United Nations administration perhaps on a temporary basis with a possibility to determine the final status by a plebiscite at a later date. The mainland Chinese and the National Government would probably oppose it. There is also serious doubt whether this arrangement would adequately safeguard the island against seizure by the Communists by subversion or invasion. In any event, Nationalist control of the island excludes this solution now.

3. An independent Formosa.

This would not be acceptable to the Chinese, whether non-Communist or Communist. An independent Formosa probably would require external military and economic support indefinitely.

4. Restoration to Japan.

The Japanese Peace Treaty divests Japan of its sovereignty over the island.

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the island. This solution has accordingly been rejected...

5. Determination of the status of Formosa and the Formosans in a free plebiscite.

In a plebiscite which might be supervised by the United Nations, the Formosans might vote for any of the above alternatives 1-4. A free plebiscite would probably be impossible under present circumstances owing to the presence of Nationalist troops on the island and opposition by the National Government.

It appears that there is no presently achievable solution for the disposition of Formosa which will satisfy United States policy objectives.

The unresolved question of ultimate control of China and many other fluid factors in Asia including the possibility of general hostilities in the Far East make it impossible at this time to define our position on the ultimate status of Formosa. On the other hand, a lapse of time may well clarify these factors.

B. Possibilities for Maintaining a Satisfactory Short Term Position.

Unlike the Korean question, where our position is supported by an important majority in the United Nations and where we are able to engage in negotiations without danger of isolation, our negotiating position on the Formosa problem is most difficult. We cannot agree to withdraw the Seventh Fleet under existing circumstances in view of the danger that the Chinese Communists would take over the island. We are equally unable to indicate that we agree that Formosa should ultimately become part of China since we do not know what Government will control China nor are we in position to support other proposals for the disposition of the island. Our military strength, particularly in the Far East, is still limited. Thus, our position leaves very little room for negotiation at this time.

On the other hand, after an armistice we may be faced with a pressure to have us agree to negotiations on Formosa, particularly if a "peace atmosphere"

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atmosphere" should develop in Paris at the Sixth Assembly. This pressure may come not only from the Asians, but also from our Western European friends who accepted our decision to neutralize the island at the most only as a temporary military expedient made necessary by the aggression in Korea. Those who will advocate negotiations will point to the fact that the United States itself, prior to the large scale

Chinese intervention in Korea, placed the question of Formosa on the agenda of the Assembly; and that Secretary Acheson indicated in the Joint Senate Committee hearings the willingness of the United States to discuss Formosa when the fighting in Korea is terminated, and the aggressor ceases the defiance to the United Nations. Finally, the Communists will again press this question and probably renew the charges made in the Security Council and the Fifth Assembly that our action with respect to Formosa constitutes aggression.

Following an armistice we may agree to participate in a conference on a political settlement for Korea insisting that negotiations in this conference must be limited to Korea.

We would oppose the calling of a special conference to consider Far Eastern problems (including Formosa) until there is a political settlement of the Korean problem. At that time we may not oppose discussion of other Far Eastern problems in an appropriate conference in which all parties with interests in the various questions to be discussed would participate.

We should also make every effort to discourage consideration of the ultimate status of Formosa in the Sixth Assembly. As indicated above, no solution acceptable to us appears feasible in the present circumstances and public discussion would only expose the differences between us and our allies.

It is likely

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It is likely that our efforts to discourage the consideration of this question in the Sixth Assembly will be successful. However, it is possible that the question may be raised again in a more objectionable form such as in the context of the mission of the Seventh Fleet. Moreover, pressure may develop in the event of an armistice, for the above referred special conference on Far Eastern problems. In such circumstances, it may be desirable for the United States to initiate or support an exhaustive study in the Assembly of the broad question of the ultimate status of Formosa as an alternative to the moves mentioned above. Any substantive recommendations would be avoided pending the study.

C. Neutralization of Formosa.

It is the policy of the United States to continue the mission presently assigned to the Seventh Fleet, as long as required by United States security interests. In the light of this policy, an armistice in Korea of itself would not so change the basic situation as to warrant terminating the neutralization of Formosa.

We are unable to foresee how long it will be necessary and advisable to continue this policy and we must therefore remain free to review it from time to time, in the light of changing circumstances.

Consequently, if the United Nations takes up the question of Formosa under present circumstances, on one hand we must avoid any move to force us to agree to withdraw the present mission of the Seventh Fleet. On the other hand we should not commit ourselves to maintain our neutralization policy for any specific period or indefinitely. We should not ask the United Nations to endorse our neutralization measures because, (a) such a request would probably not receive an adequate majority, (b) a United Nations endorsement would tie our hands if we should decide to lift the restrictions imposed upon the National Government by the neutralization policy.

D. Proposal

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D. Proposal for study and inquiry:

In the event that the consideration of the Formosa question becomes unavoidable, the United States should endeavor to place emphasis on the need for a peaceful solution of the Formosa question in the interest of the international community and of the people of Formosa. We should say that the problem of ultimate status of Formosa requires an extensive study as a question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 11 and requiring peaceful adjustment under Article 14, with full opportunity for ascertaining all pertinent facts, hearing all interested parties and considering all possible solutions. The General Assembly should appoint a Commission to study the problem in all of its aspects and report its findings at a later unspecified date.

1. Composition of the Commission.

In general in the commission the proportion of members recognizing the National Government should be roughly the same as obtains in the General Assembly, and the United States should be represented in it. However, it should be recognized that the problem of composition would raise a number of serious difficulties.

2. United States Attitude on the Merits of the Formosa Problem.

In the Assembly we should make clear our conviction that in present circumstances the island should not be handed over to Communist China. We should point out, however, that in our view the problem of the ultimate status of Formosa should be explored by the Commission and that we have no specific solution in mind at this time. We should further state that in our view the purpose of the Commission is to bring out all relevant factors and provide a full exchange of views; and that we expect to formulate our position as the work of the Commission progresses.

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progresses. Beyond this we should indicate that the Commission should give consideration to all factors including the Chinese claim to Formosa, the well-being and wishes of the Formosans themselves, and the interests of the United Nations in promoting peace and security in the Western Pacific area. This interest of the United Nations embraces not only the need for a peaceful solution of this problem where use of force had been threatened; it necessitates taking into account such other factors as the past use of Formosa as a base for military aggression and the possible future use of it for this purpose.

3. Work of the Commission.

The scope and character of the study would be defined in the broadest possible terms and the Commission would have wide discretion in determining how far and in what direction it wishes to proceed. It would hear any person it desires. It may recommend some procedure for determining the selection of representatives of the Formosan people who would present the Formosan views to the Commission. It would report to the Assembly at such time as it will consider advisable.

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PROBLEM:

To determine the United States position on Formosa in the Sixth General Assembly if there is no armistice in Korea.

UNITED STATES POSITION:

The policy of the United States is to deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the U.S.S.R. and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. In the light of this policy, as appears below, no acceptable disposition of Formosa appears possible at this time. Our immediate objective therefore is to postpone the issue, and work so far as possible toward the development of an acceptable solution, keeping in mind the importance of maintaining the maximum possible support of other nations, particularly among the Asians.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The United States should oppose:

- a. Any General Assembly move to link the Formosa question to the settlement of the Korean problem;
- b. Any move to call a conference on Far Eastern problems,

(including Formosa).

2. We should oppose consideration of the Formosa question in the General Assembly.

COMMENT:

Last February we pointed out in the Assembly that at the time when we proposed the inclusion of "The Question of Formosa" in the Assembly's agenda in September of 1950, there had been prospects of an early end to the hostilities in Korea. The situation had, however, changed as a result

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a result of the Chinese Communist aggression. A satisfactory settlement of the question of Formosa was unlikely in the circumstances and we stated that no useful purpose would be served by discussing it. A large majority of the Members agreed to postpone the discussion.

The reasons for postponement still prevail.

If the question is raised in the Assembly we should have adequate support in the General Assembly for continued indefinite postponement.

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